Conditions are explored under which a putative EU-wide layer of income tax, additional to the national income taxes of the Member States, would: (a) be horizontally equitable, taking the equals in different EU counties to be those at the same percentile points in the country-specific income distributions, assuming these to differ in logarithms by location and scale only; (b) satisfy an extended equity criterion, that of equal progression among equals; and (c) engender equal sacrifices from the citizens of each country in terms of rank-dependent and utilitarian social evaluation functions. Numerical simulations are undertaken to explore the form that such an EU-wide income tax would take and the properties it would have.
Introduction
The prospect -or, in the UK at least, the spectre -of an EU income tax occasionally looms, both in the popular press and also in the European Parliament. To whit, consider the old headline "Now Britain faces single European tax system: France and Germany spearhead plan to control revenue and social security" in The Independent newspaper of 16 th January 1997, and the article, nine years on, entitled "Now EU wants a £510 income tax" in The Daily Express newspaper of December 31 st 2006, which was prompted, no doubt, by the opinion expressed at a recent EU summit by M. Jose Maria Gil-Robles, President of the European Parliament, that "the direct taxation of the people would more closely involve individual citizens with the European government". A certain UK web blogger noted, in reaction to this news, "Oh Brilliant. We already shell out billions of pounds for an organisation we don't want to be in as well as having to put up with stupid laws that they shove on us … When will it end? If they do manage to get a European income tax I will refuse to pay it. Even if it means jail time". It is worth noting, however, that economists do not, as yet at any rate, advocate an EU-wide income tax (see e.g.
Cnossen 2002 on this).
In this paper, we consider the putative introduction of an EU-wide layer of income tax, additional to the national income taxes of the Member States, whose revenue would go directly to the centre. One can imagine the new tax being levied at a universal flat rate on all disposable incomes, in order not to interfere with relative income differentials between and within countries. It is a small leap from there to suppose that a concessionary rate for the poorest countries might be instituted, and another small leap to a plethora of flat rates, negotiated country-by-country by the politicians, and perhaps to the introduction of progression.
For systematic analysis, the question of an EU-wide social welfare function (henceforth SWF) arises, in which a person's domicile may or may not be a relevant factor. However, as shown by Lambert (2002a, 2002b) , if domicile is not relevant to social welfare, and a common income tax were devised, applicable in all countries, then both overall welfare and inequality could potentially be improved by allowing an element of differentiation into this tax -thereby, at least on the face of it, admitting horizontal inequity.
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If allowance is made for differences in the taxable capacities of citizens of the different Member States, then of course horizontal inequity does not automatically follow from different within-country tax treatments. Recent research shows that, depending on the mechanism that identifies the equals across countries, an extended equal treatment characteristic, that of equal progression among equals, which could be said to supplement both the vertical and horizontal aspects, may also be achievable -alongside both vertical equity and classical horizontal equity (Ebert and Lambert, 2004) .
How should we identify the equals across the EU countries? Ought we to admit of differences in need or social desert based on domicile? As between an income unit in Luxembourg having €35,000 p.a. and an income unit in Latvia also having €35,000 p.a., which is socially the more deserving of an additional euro? Arguably the one in Luxembourg suffers more relative deprivation than the one in Latvia, being further down its country-specific distribution of living standards (Runciman, 1966) in Latvia also having €35,000 p.a. We shall be able to examine the appropriate differences in tax treatment of such income units shortly.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain the procedure for identifying the equals in different EU countries and define the appropriate criteria for both classical horizontal equity and an extended equity command, equal progression among equals, in an EU-wide layer of income tax. In Section 3, we introduce the positional equity concept, and identify the criterion for achieving positional equity across the EU under the assumption that the member countries' income distributions differ in logarithms only by location and scale. In Section 4, we divert to briefly discuss equal sacrifice taxation in case the social evaluation function takes a mixed utilitarian and rank dependent form, in which case one's tax liability is a function of both one's income and one's percentile in the income distribution. In Section 5 we explore normative conditions under which the positionally equitable EU income tax could be regarded as engendering equal sacrifices within each EU country. Section 6 considers what such a tax system would look like in practice, and also contains some final remarks.
A putative EU-wide income tax: equity criteria
For simplicity, let us confine attention to two countries, A and B say, and let us assume that a person's domicile enters into the SWF as well as his or her income level. Then, following Ebert's (2000) approach, set in the general context of social heterogeneity in a population, we may introduce an equivalent income function to conduct the business of identifying the equals across countries in terms of their living standards. For country A, we express living standard in terms of money income. For country B, a function S:
is invoked, to express as S(x) the equivalent living standard in country A of a citizen of country B who has a nominal income level of x. The function S(x) need only be continuous and strictly increasing (Ebert, 2000) . For n > 2 countries, say A and B 1 , B 2 … B n-1 , n-1 such functions would be needed. 
(S(x)) = t B (x)
would be the criterion. For more on these two, see Lambert (2004b) . 5 See op cit. for further details, and also Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) . The progression measure is residual progression, defined for a schedule t(x) as the elasticity of post-tax income v(x) = x -t(x) with respect to pretax income, i.e. as xv '(x)/v(x) .
position. 6 Taking the equals in the different EU countries to be those at the same percentile points, (1) can be used to specify an EU-wide layer of additional income tax which both assures equal treatment by percentile in the classical sense and also equal progression by percentile. (1), and taking t A (x) as given, the following formula for
(2) that for equity, t B (x) should also be proportional:
An EU-wide layer of differentiated proportional tax surcharges could thus be supported as fully equitable if a ≠ 1. Proportional EU taxes would have the advantage of not interfering with relative income differentials within countries. They would have to be differentiated to the extent that inequality differed between countries. In the lognormal case, the flat tax rate would have to be higher in more unequal countries, and lower in less unequal countries.
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Whatever tax schedule is selected for country A, proportional or not, so long as it expresses the desired degree of vertical equity in country A, the tax for B is dictated by the equity requirement in (2), and this guarantees not only equal treatment by percentile in the classical sense but also equal progression by percentile across countries. . A minor error in Lambert (2004a) led to this relationship being incorrectly described there.
Positional social welfare and equal sacrifice
If the tax schedule chosen for country A by the EU tax designers is such that it engenders equal sacrifices within that country, according to a local (country A) social decisionmaker's imposed value judgement, does the tax schedule required by (2) to hold in country B also engender equal sacrifices as perceived within country B? This would be very pleasant, as it would allow the politicians in country B to ensure their country-folk that the tax they will have to pay has been well thought-out, but condition (2), for equity, is paramount; the answer to the equal sacrifice question depends entirely on the evaluation functions attributed by the social decision-makers in each country. We investigate this question now.
Despite the avowedly utilitarian nature of equal sacrifice analysis, Yaari (1988) has shown that the principle can also be articulated in terms of a rank-dependent (linear) social welfare function, in which case one's tax liability becomes a function of one's position in the distribution of income rather than one's income per se. Lambert and Naughton (2006) extend the equal sacrifice prescription to a class of mixed utilitarian and rank-dependent social welfare functions, which invoke a social utility-of-income function and also attribute weights giving systematically differing social importance to different people's positions in the income distribution. In such a case, tax liability is a function of both one's income and one's position. This model seems to be worth investigating in the EU context, given the positional equity criterion already articulated.
The Lambert and Naughton (2006) analysis is based upon a doubly parametric family of social evaluation functions of the form
is the distribution function for taxable income. These are "mixed" utilitarian and rank-dependent social welfare functions, as originally introduced by Berrebi and Silber (1981) and further developed by Araar and Duclos (2005) . 8 The special case 1 υ = generates the utilitarian SWF popularized by Atkinson in his 1970
paper and presaged in the work of Kolm (1965 Kolm ( , 1968 Kolm ( , 1969 . The special case e = 0 is that of the Yaari (1988) linear and rank-dependent SWF.
An equal sacrifice tax function t(x) for this social evaluation function takes the
if e ≠ 1, and
when e = 1, for some x 0 ≥ 0 and, unless 1 υ = , for some x 1 such that 
Value judgements for positional equity and equal sacrifice
Let the social evaluation function in country A be ( , )
A Z e υ defined as in (4) 
if e ≠ 1, and ( ) 
What does it take in order that this "induced" tax t B (x) also be an equal sacrifice 
, and
(with end-of-range restrictions which we shall simply assume from now on).
Comparing (7a)- (7b) with (8a)- (8b), the following result is fairly immediate.
Theorem
If υ υ = % , 1 .
1
(1 ) and (7) and (8) If (12) does hold, then the following is implied by (11): if 0 < e < 1, inequality aversion i ẽ (< 1) will be lower the higher is a i (i.e. the lower is inequality in country B i ), whilst if e > 1, inequality aversion i ẽ (> 1) will be higher the higher is a i (i.e. the lower is inequality in country B i ). We have not seen such links suggested between inequality and inequality aversion in any other literature.
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10 As Lambert and Naughton (2006) show for this equal sacrifice model, there is a one-to-one relationship between the per capita sacrifice level and the revenue raised by the tax. 11 One might wish that the model would validate a lower concern for inequality in countries where inequality is lower, but this is clearly not the case: a positive association between 1 and B i e i σ − % is suggested, given A σ . Atkinson (1970, p. 251) argues for higher inequality aversion in richer counties: "it might quite reasonably be argued that as the general level of income rises we are more concerned about inequality," whilst Lambert et al. (2003) find a tendency for inequality aversion and inequality to move in opposite directions between countries "…the inference that relatively inequality averse countries have lower levels of objective inequality appears robust" (see also Harvey, 2005 , on this). 
Positionally equitable equal sacrifice taxes in the EU: some illustrative calculations
so that average tax rates are not the same at corresponding positions in the two distributions (recall footnote 4 on this). Equation (13) Table 1 shows the four countries we selected. They are Luxembourg (HH), Denmark (HL), Portugal (LH) and Italy (LL).
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12 These points can be identified from the equations
The distributions used by Cholezas and Tsakloglou exclude those for the Netherlands and Sweden (due to lack of data), are for earnings net of tax (except for France and Finland due to data deficiencies), and in all cases are by the hour. However, the high-low categorization in terms of means accords with that of the OECD for real GDP her head in 2002. See Eurostat (2004) , in which Luxembourg is characterized as a high income country, Denmark is a high-middle income country, Italy is at the bottom of the high-middle group and Portugal is low-middle. Table 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mean of log hourly earnings, which would correspond to the lognormal parameter θ of our model, were it to be couched in terms of hourly earnings, can be derived from the mean hourly wage M and variance of logarithms Table 2 . 
In order to proceed with stylized calculations, representing putative HH, HL, LH and LL member countries of the EU but not actual ones dependent on specific estimates, we select representative "high" and "low" values for the lognormal parameters, namely these:
The new and emergent countries of the EU generally have much lower per capita income levels, but similar inequality experiences as the older member states (i.e. some high and -14-some low).
14 An "ultra- 
although we shall not need the b i -values for the calculation of average tax rates at percentiles (recall (13) and (15a)-(15b)). We set 1, 2 υ = (representing the utilitarian and Gini-based mixed SWF respectively), and choose 1 2 , 1, 2 e = as the inequality aversion parameter in country HH (equal to that in the other high-inequality countries, from (11), from which it also follows that inequality aversion in the low-inequality countries has to be 0.065, 1, 2.87 e = % for coherence with the model). Table 3 shows average tax rate by percentile in each of the six representative types of country in the case that 0.01,
when the average tax rate at median income in country HH is set at 1%. -15- 
As Table 3 shows, the utilitarian equal sacrifice tax is regressive when 1 2 e = . In fact this would be so for any e < 1: see Young (1990) . Also the tax is regressive when e = 1 in the Gini-based case: see Lambert and Naughton (2006) on this. Notice that in all cases the average tax rate at the median is 1% in high inequality countries and 0.54% in low inequality countries (and these are the flat rates at all percentiles if 1 e υ = = ). For 2 υ = , the average tax rate rises much faster along the income parade when e = 2 than when 1 2 e = , but starts from a lower base. Table 4 compares the tax rates which would be experienced at fixed income levels in the different countries. The fixed income levels chosen for these comparisons are those to be found at the 20 th to 80 th percentile points in country HH. Comparing HH with HL, we see that among the richer countries of the EU, those with less inequality have lower tax rates at any given income level. The constellations LH, LL, UH, UL represent poorer old EU countries and new and emergent ones. Taxpayers in these countries can expect to pay higher taxes than those living in the richer countries at the same income level. The tax rates in UL are extraordinarily high, but of course the income values in UL which correspond to the decile values in HH are right at the top, where the density of taxpayers is extremely thin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we turn to the Luxembourg/Latvia question in terms of which we opened this whole discussion. A net annual income of €35,000 in Luxembourg is at approximately the 70 th percentile on the basis of Cholezas and Tsakloglou's (2007) estimates. 15 Taking Latvia to be represented by UH (on which, recall footnote 14), we see from Table 4 that the additional layer of income tax across the EU, if designed to satisfy positional equity and equal sacrifice, could lead to tax rates of the order of 1 2 1 % 2% − in
Luxembourg and 4%-7% in Latvia on an annual disposable income of €35,000
(depending on parameter values).
If horizontal equity across the EU called for equal average tax rates, rather than equal treatment in the sense of (2), then of course none of the analysis of this paper would apply (as we said in footnote 4). We have conditioned the analysis on a positional equity criterion, according to which the equals in different EU countries are those at the same percentile points in the country-specific income distributions. We also assumed that the country-specific income distributions differ in logarithms by location and scale only. Our illustrative calculations have shown that, under these assumptions, it would be feasible to design an EU income tax which would engender both equal progression among equals and equal sacrifices from the citizens of each country in terms of rank-dependent and utilitarian social evaluation functions. The way is open for more serious work, should the issue of the direct taxation of EU citizens actually reach the political agenda.
